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THE NCAA’S LOST CAUSE AND THE LEGAL
EASE OF REDEFINING AMATEURISM
VIRGINIA A. FITT†
ABSTRACT
The recent resolution of the Andrew Oliver case may mark the
death throes of the NCAA’s no-agent rule, prohibiting college athletes
from retaining agents in professional contract negotiations, and
perhaps the traditional paradigm of amateurism in sport. In light of
the trial court’s ruling, as well as continuing calls for the revocation of
the NCAA’s tax-exempt status, the time is ripe for a reexamination of
amateurism and the law.
This Note argues that the NCAA has developed a complicated web
of largely unenforceable rules and regulations that are unnecessary to
maintain tax-exempt status in light of the regulatory environment.
This Note examines the antitrust, labor, and tax consequences of
changing definitions of amateurism. Focusing on the Internal
Revenue Service interpretations of amateurism, this Note concludes
that a less restrictive amateurism regime would still achieve many of
the legal benefits sought by the NCAA. This analysis has broader
implications for tax policy and the culture of sport.
Calling for a shift to a “new amateurism,” this Note contributes
a novel redefinition of amateurism that reflects the current
environment of intercollegiate sport. Modern amateurism should
recognize the profit motive of the student-athlete. Under a less
restrictive NCAA rule-making regime, the remaining rules are
enforceable and fair. In substituting protections for student-athletes in
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place of the current paternalism, the NCAA will reduce the likelihood
that future rules will be overturned by court challenges.

INTRODUCTION
Deep into the night of Friday, May 30, 2008, Andrew Oliver
fought for his college baseball life. Compliance officials from
Oklahoma State and the NCAA interviewed him from about
8:30 p.m. until after midnight and then questioned his father from
1
12:30 until the small hours of the morning . . . .

Projected first-round draft pick Andrew Oliver had become a
true ace on the mound for the Oklahoma State Cowboys as a
2
sophomore left-handed pitcher. Oliver’s team had earned a coveted
spot in the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA)
Tournament’s initial field of 64 and on May 30 the team started down
the road to the 2008 College World Series in Omaha in the Stillwater
3
Regional. But Oliver never got a chance to join his team in
4
postseason play. Just hours before Oliver was slated to pitch on
May 31 against Wichita State, his athletic eligibility was revoked
5
“indefinitely” for a violation of the NCAA’s amateurism rules.
Oliver’s actions would in any other context be described as
prudent: a high school senior, Oliver retained an agent-attorney to
assist him in a complex financial arrangement with a sophisticated
6
party, and his attorney was present during contract negotiations.
Those actions, which came to light two years later, clearly violated the
7
8
NCAA’s no-agent rule, which is found in the organization’s bylaws.

1. Aaron Fitt, Baseball’s Agent Quagmire: Oliver Case Dredges up Agent-NCAA
Questions, BASEBALL AM., Sept. 8–21, 2008, at 8.
2. Aaron Fitt, Headed to Trial: Oliver Case May Have Lasting Ramifications, BASEBALL
AM., Dec. 22, 2008, http://www.baseballamerica.com/today/college/on-campus/2009/267366.
html.
3. 2008 NCAA Baseball Tournament Schedule/Results, ESPN.COM, June 26, 2008,
http://sports.espn.go.com/ncaa/news/story?id=3412793.
4. See Fitt, supra note 1, at 8 (“The Cowboys would be without their ace lefthander for
the postseason . . . .”).
5. Id.
6. Oliver v. NCAA (Oliver I), No. 2008-CV-0762, slip op. at 2–3 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl., Feb.
12, 2009).
7. See NCAA MEMBERSHIP SERVS. STAFF, 2008–09 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL § 12.3
(2008), available at http://ncaapublications.com/Uploads/PDF/D1_Manual9d74a0b2-d10d-45
87-8902-b0c781e128ae.pdf (prohibiting collegiate players from contracting with agents and
limiting contact between player representatives and professional organizations).
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Oliver’s punishment was swift and severe; he lost eligibility for post9
season play in 2008 and for the entire 2009 season, compromising his
10
value in the 2009 MLB draft.
Typically, a trial court opinion in Erie County, Ohio has little
national significance. But the trial judge invalidated the NCAA’s noagent rule—a result predicted by almost no one but Andrew Oliver’s
11
12
attorney. Although the case has since settled, this action represents
a first blow to the NCAA’s rules against professional agents
13
representing college athletes. The damage done to the no-agent rule
14
is probably irreversible: because the NCAA was unable to
8. Oliver I, slip op. at 15.
9. Id., slip op. at 4. A similar 2002 enforcement action against Vanderbilt player Jeremy
Sowers led to a six-game suspension, and the no-agent rule has otherwise been only sparsely
enforced. Fitt, supra note 1, at 8. Oliver returned to play following a court order and was the
ninth pick in the second round, and the fifty-eighth overall pick, when selected by the Detroit
Tigers in the 2009 Major League Baseball draft. Press Release, Okla. State Univ., Oliver
Selected on First Day of Major League Baseball Draft (June 9, 2009), available at
http://www.okstate.com/sports/m-basebl/spec-rel/060909aaa.html.
10. See Oliver I, slip op. at 26 (“If an injunction is not granted the Plaintiff would suffer loss
of his college baseball experience, impairment or loss of future baseball professional career, loss
in being available for the upcoming draft because he is less likely to be seen, and ongoing
damage to Plaintiff’s reputation and baseball career.”). Oliver signed with the Detroit Tigers for
a reported $1.495 million bonus as a second-round draft pick and the fifty-eighth pick overall.
Steve Kornacki, Tigers Sign Top Picks Jacob Turner, Andrew Oliver, MLIVE.COM, Aug. 18,
2009, http://www.mlive.com/tigers/index.ssf/2009/08/tigers_sign_top_draft_picks_ja.html.
11. See Fitt, supra note 1, at 9 (suggesting that a challenge to the no-agent rule would fail
and that, at most, modest changes may be achieved through indirect pressure).
12. Aaron Fitt, Oliver Settlement Restores ‘No Agent’ Rule, BASEBALL AM., Oct. 8, 2009,
http://www.baseballamerica.com/blog/college/?p=2568 (reporting the NCAA’s $750,000
settlement with Andrew Oliver). However, the case was unlikely to be overturned on appeal in
Ohio if the parties had not reached a settlement agreement. See Oliver I, slip op. at 8 (“An
application for an injunction is addressed to the sound discretion of this Court, and unless there
is a plain abuse of discretion on the part of this Court in granting or for that matter in refusing
injunctions, reviewing courts will not disturb such judgments.” (citing Perkins v. Vill. of Quaker
City, 133 N.E.2d 595 (Ohio 1956))). The NCAA has, as expected, filed a challenge to the ruling,
but this initial appeal was denied as premature, and only the damages portion of the trial
remained. Oliver v. NCAA (Oliver II), No. 2008-CV-0762, slip op. at 5–8 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl.,
Apr. 1, 2009).
13. Oliver I, slip op. at 18–21.
14. See Michael Cross, Andrew Oliver, the MLB Draft, and the College World Series,
ULTIMATE SPORTS INSIDER, May 25, 2009, http://www.ultimatesportsinsider.com/2009/05/
andrew-oliver-mlb-draft-and-college.html (“I don’t see how the NCAA can put the genie back
in the bottle regarding legal representation for [student] athletes.”); Fitt, supra note 12 (“[I]f the
NCAA plans to actually try to enforce the rule . . . the return to the status quo won’t last
long.”). Before the 2009 draft, the NCAA issued a memo to college baseball players that was
interpreted as a scare tactic to minimize the impact of the Ohio court’s ruling. Liz Mullen,
Agents, Union Question NCAA Memo on Baseball Advisers, SPORTSBUSINESS J., May 18, 2009,
http://www.sportsbusinessjournal.com/article/62483. The NCAA later had to explain the memo
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successfully defend its enforcement of the rule in court, the Oliver
case and its hefty subsequent settlement will encourage studentathletes to challenge enforcement actions that damage their prospects
for the professional drafts.
Those wondering whether the NCAA goliath can be brought
down by a pebble thrown in Erie County will be disappointed; the
reality of the impact is likely far murkier. The likely loss of the noagent rule considerably undermines the NCAA’s traditional defense,
namely, the inherent value of amateurism. But the NCAA’s
anachronistic definition of amateurism was likely far more restrictive
than necessary to achieve the organization’s primary legal goals:
15
insulation from labor law, antitrust violations, and tax liability. The
NCAA likely has the flexibility to bear the loss of this rule and a
number of other amateurism battles and still maintain its exempt
16
status.
This Note examines the NCAA’s amateurism rules in the context
of one of their underlying purposes—the insulation of the NCAA and
17
colleges from areas of law that would otherwise apply —and
concludes that the NCAA could and should adopt more permissive
amateurism rules. The new rules would better reflect the reality of
intercollegiate athletics and still comply with legal standards for
amateurism, particularly those of the Internal Revenue Service
18
(IRS). Part I contextualizes the amateurism discussion, including the
in contempt hearings, Michael Cross, Andrew Oliver Case Update: NCAA Avoids Contempt of
Court, ULTIMATE SPORTS INSIDER, July 14, 2009, http://www.ultimatesportsinsider.com/
2009/07/andrew-oliver-case-update-ncaa-avoids.html, but the organization continued to
intimidate college baseball players into not hiring agents. See Letter from Stephen T. Webb,
Assoc. Dir. of Amateurism Certification, NCAA Eligibility Ctr., to Baseball Prospective
Student-Athletes (Aug. 19, 2009) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (“It is our staff’s
understanding that you were selected by a Major League Baseball (MLB) club in the June 2009
Rule 4 Draft and have decided not to sign a professional contract. Please provide the following
information relating to your contact with MLB clubs and your relationship with your
advisor. . . . Please note that NCAA regulations require you to provide complete and accurate
information to the NCAA Eligibility Center relating to your amateurism certification
request.”).
15. See infra Part IV.A.
16. See infra Parts III.B–IV.A.
17. Amy Christian McCormick & Robert A. McCormick, The Emperor’s New Clothes:
Lifting the NCAA’s Veil of Amateurism, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 495, 497 (2008) (identifying
areas of law “in which the myth of amateurism has served to shield university athletic programs
and the NCAA from regulation”).
18. Although the NCAA could conceivably also qualify as a tax-exempt trade organization
under IRS rules, it is important that the NCAA qualify under the amateur sports and education
exemptions because of its role as an umbrella organization for collegiate athletics organizations.
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evolution of the ideal of amateurism in sport. Part II describes the
rules that the NCAA has implemented to protect amateurism and
their widespread failure and resulting collateral damage. Part III
examines the general legal import of amateurism and significantly
adds to the tax law analysis, suggesting that the NCAA can
deregulate amateurism without triggering tax consequences. Finally,
Part IV evaluates how a redefinition of amateurism would impact the
NCAA’s legal protections and provides a model for a new
amateurism. This Note’s model would advance trends that would not
only preserve the legal status of the NCAA as an amateur sports
organization but would also deregulate intercollegiate athletics to the
benefit of the athletes.
I. THE IDEAL OF AMATEURISM
The NCAA defines amateurism in both normative and positive
terms: “Student-athletes shall be amateurs in an intercollegiate sport,
and their participation should be motivated primarily by education
and by the physical, mental and social benefits to be derived. Student
participation in intercollegiate athletics is an avocation, and studentathletes should be protected from exploitation by professional and
19
commercial enterprises.”
The NCAA’s normative definition of amateurism addresses the
motivations of players, recalling an earlier history of amateurism. But
the current descriptive reality of collegiate amateurism exposes the
irony of the NCAA. Characterizing student participation in collegelevel athletics as an “avocation” is actually a truer statement than the
NCAA’s drafters likely intended: the word means both “[a]n activity
taken up in addition to one’s regular work or profession, usually for
20
enjoyment” and “[o]ne’s regular work or profession.” Internally
contradictory, the word perfectly captures the NCAA’s amateurism
21
dilemma.
Amateurism is assumed to be good. This notion of amateurism is
characterized by nostalgia for a time when sport was played for pure
love. This misremembered glory serves as the foundation for the
If the NCAA failed to plausibly preserve the distinction, the author contends that colleges
would likely form a new umbrella organization that better protects the tax exemption. Thus, a
retreat to other exemptions would be largely self-defeating.
19. NCAA MEMBERSHIP SERVS. STAFF, supra note 7, § 2.9 (emphasis added).
20. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 124 (4th ed. 2000).
21. See infra Part II.
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modern sense of loss elicited by today’s mottled state of amateur
sport. The amateurism mythology originated in early Greece where,
as the fiction insists, the original Olympians were unsullied by
22
compensation for sport. This history is largely allegoric; there were
23
actually no known bars to compensation in ancient Greece. Greeks
often generously rewarded athletes, with prize purses reaching ten
24
years’ wages. The early disciples of Olympic amateurism in the
United States, however, fed the false archetype: “The [Olympic]
Games . . . lost their purity and high idealism. . . . [S]port must be for
25
sport’s sake.”
Between the emergence of the Greek ideal of sport and its errant
recollection in modern times, amateurism surfaced in England in a
form remembered with less fondness. Amateurism, as defined in 1866
by an English organization, demanded that amateur athletes had
26
never taught athletics for pay or competed for prizes. The amateur
ideal evolved in modern England so that gentlemen would never have
27
to lose at sport to commoners. American sport thus reinvented
Greek heroes to justify an ideal actually bred by Victorian classism.
The imprint of this tradition is still visible in modern American
athletic governance.
In 1906, the Intercollegiate Athletic Association, an organization
28
that would eventually evolve into the NCAA, held its first
29
convention to develop restrictive principles of amateurism. There

22. See Definition of an Amateur Athlete: Nations of the Earth Where Modern Sport
Flourishes to Agree on More Drastic Rules to Keep Professionalism Away from Amateurism,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1913, at S4 [hereinafter Definition of an Amateur Athlete]; see also Amateur
Athlete Status Is Defined: Must Compete “Only for Love of Sport”—Certain Kinds of Prizes
Barred, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 1914, at 8 (describing changes to the Olympic model to preserve
amateurism).
23. Kenneth L. Shropshire, Legislation for the Glory of Sport: Amateurism and
Compensation, 1 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 7, 9–12 (1991).
24. Id. at 10.
25. Id. at 11 (quoting AVERY BRUNDAGE, USOC REPORT OF THE GAMES OF THE XIV
OLYMPIAD 23–25 (1948) (second alteration in original)).
26. Id. at 12–13.
27. The definition was class-divisive and protectionist: “The Amateur Athletic Club of
England was established to give English gentlemen the opportunity to compete against each
other without having to involve and compete against professionals.” Id. at 12.
28. NCAA, The History of the NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/ncaa?ContentID=1354
(last visited Oct. 24, 2009).
29. Kay Hawes, Debate on Amateurism Has Evolved over Time: Association Prepares for
Another Round of Talks on the Issue at 2000 Convention, NCAA NEWS, Jan. 3, 2000,
http://www.ncaa.org/wps/ncaa?ContentID=26742.
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was to be no recruiting (termed “proselytizing”) of top preparatory
school athletes, and no scholarships were permitted for athletic
30
31
ability. The gentility provisions from early English sport remained.
This maxim of once a professional, always a professional, though now
32
less restrictive, is still pervasive in NCAA regulation of amateurism.
The early amateurism battle within the Intercollegiate Athletic
33
Association revolved around baseball. As it grew in popularity
during the early twentieth century, baseball spawned opportunities
34
for athletes to profit in major, minor, and summer leagues. The
summer leagues, which attracted large numbers of intercollegiate
35
baseball players, drew prompt criticism. According to some critics,
those who participated in the summer leagues lost eligibility merely
by associating with professionals, whether or not there was
36
remuneration for play. To others, the motivation to participate in
the summer leagues was more benign, and the intercollegiate players
were analogous to other students who used their talents for pay, such
37
as actors or perhaps musicians.
The dialogue between two university officials captured the
38
contrasting viewpoints of the NCAA amateurism debate. Amos
Alonzo Stagg of the University of Chicago opposed any relaxation of
39
the amateurism rules. With Nostradamic insight, Stagg stated his
fire-and-brimstone vision of the future of amateurism: “[I]t is my
prophecy that in a few years you will find that many of our large cities
will be supporting professional football teams composed of ex-college
players . . . the passing of [less restrictive amateurism rules] would be

30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See infra Part II.A.
33. See Trying to Define Amateur Athlete: Intercollegiate Athletic Association Committee
Suggests Strict Law, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1909, at 53 (describing a proposed definition of
amateurism that would end the practice of college students playing baseball in summer leagues
for pay).
34. See Hawes, supra note 29 (“One of the first divisive issues in the NCAA involved
amateurism. In the 1900s, professional baseball began to grow in popularity. Many college
athletes began turning to minor-league baseball as a way to make money during the summer
months, setting off a heated debate.”).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See id. (describing the amateurism debate between Amos Alonzo Stagg and J.P.
Welsh).
39. Id.
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40

an unceasing catastrophe.” Professor J.P. Welsh of Pennsylvania
State University casts the debate in terms of intrinsic capitalism,
arguing that a college student who earns money during the summer
“needs to be let alone in the full, free, untrammeled exercise of his
American citizenship, which entitles him to life, liberty and the
41
pursuit of happiness, which sometimes means money.”
There were passionate and vocal advocates on both sides of the
amateurism debate. When the committee on summer baseball
reported back to the national organization, however, its report was
clear: amateurism directly opposes the playing of athletics for
42
material gain. The NCAA provisions explicitly prohibited paid
43
summer baseball participation. The amateurism debate emerged
again after World War I, with returning soldiers attending college and
44
playing football for pay on the weekends. Again, the student45
athletes lost the amateurism battle. Now when athletes play on
summer teams in Cape Cod or in the Carolinas, they do so without
46
pay, and weekend play during the school year is not permitted. As
the preceding history suggests, “the vexed question” of amateurism
demonstrates the “difficulty of drawing the line between ‘love’ and
47
‘money.’”

40. Id. While Stagg’s vision has largely come true, few would likely describe its results as
“unceasing catastrophe.”
41. Id.
42. Id.; Trying to Define Amateur Athlete: Intercollegiate Athletic Association Committee
Suggests Strict Law, supra note 33.
43. Hawes, supra note 29; see also id. (“In 1916, the Association’s members finally agreed
to insert a definition of amateurism into the bylaws. The definition that passed was one written
by the Athletic Research Society: ‘An amateur athlete is one who participates in competitive
physical sports only for the pleasure and the physical, mental, moral and social benefits directly
derived therefrom.’”).
44. Id.
45. Id. Although the NCAA rules prohibited summer baseball for pay, enforcement
continued to be a problem. See id. (“Summer baseball continues to give much trouble in the
enforcement of the amateur law. . . . It is to be regretted that all the colleges do not unite on a
whole-hearted and effective effort to prevent their undergraduates playing, without loss of
amateur status, baseball for money or its equivalent.” (quoting Palmer E. Pierce, President,
NCAA)).
46. Summer leagues, however, often arrange for other summer employment for the players
that provide a source of income and accommodates their playing schedule. See infra notes 168–
71 and accompanying text.
47. Definition of an Amateur Athlete, supra note 22.
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II. THE REALITY OF AMATEURISM IN INTERCOLLEGIATE SPORT
The NCAA’s amateurism idealism has failed to foster its
intended reality. The amateurism principle rests on two prongs: the
athletes are unpaid and they are not merely professionals in training.
Along these lines, the NCAA has attempted to insulate college sports
48
from becoming a supermarket for professional teams. The first
prong of the amateurism principle is supported by compensation
49
rules. The second prong is theoretically supported by the twin pillars
50
of the no-agent and no-draft rules. But the no-agent rule, a seldom51
enforced but formidable hammer, is crumbling in practice. The
protective measures of the NCAA, which faces a now perennial
52
discussion about commercialization, are under attack.
Section A of this Part describes the NCAA’s rules to protect
amateurism. Section B recounts the commercialization of
intercollegiate athletics and depicts the NCAA’s idealistic notion of
amateurism as practically unrealistic. For example, some of the

48. See generally NCAA MEMBERSHIP SERVS. STAFF, supra note 7, §§ 12.1–.6 (listing the
rules related to amateurism).
49. See id. § 12.02.3 (“A professional athlete is one who receives any kind of payment,
directly or indirectly, for athletics participation except as permitted by the governing legislation
of the Association.”); id. § 12.1.2 (“An individual loses amateur status . . . if the individual:
(a) [u]ses his or her athletics skill (directly or indirectly) for pay in any form in that sport;
(b) [a]ccepts a promise of pay even if such pay is to be received following completion of
intercollegiate athletics participation; (c) [s]igns a contract or commitment of any kind to play
professional athletics, regardless of its legal enforceability or any consideration received . . . .”);
id. (listing prohibited forms of pay and exceptions); id. § 12.2 (describing permissible and
impermissible interactions with professional teams); id. §§ 12.4–.5 (limiting the employment of
student-athletes and the promotional appearance or use of student-athletes’ reputations).
50. See id. § 12.2.4 (explaining the draft rules and exceptions); id. § 12.3 (barring certain
interactions with agents).
51. See generally Fitt, supra note 1 (describing widespread disregard for the rule and its
rare enforcement). The discussion regarding enforcement of the no-agent rule centers largely on
the sport of college baseball. The incentive to break the rule is not as high in other college
sports, and thus the rule may have more overall effectiveness in those sports.
52. See, e.g., ANDREW ZIMBALIST, UNPAID PROFESSIONALS: COMMERCIALISM AND
CONFLICT IN BIG-TIME COLLEGE SPORTS 195 (1999) (“If, as college sports continues to
commercialize, the NCAA loses some of its cartel powers and tax benefits, then many predict
the 1997 restructuring will be followed by a formal exodus of big-time schools.”); McCormick &
McCormick, supra note 17, at 496 (“[T]hese college sports are fantastically commercial and
decidedly not amateur.”); Gabriel A. Morgan, Note, No More Playing Favorites: Reconsidering
the Conclusive Congressional Presumption that Intercollegiate Athletics Are Substantially Related
to Educational Purposes, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 149, 181–86 (2007) (explaining the effects of
commercialism); Gary Brown, Brand Calls for Increased Focus on Commercialism, NCAA
NEWS, Jan. 16, 2009, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/ncaa?ContentID=43969 (summarizing former
NCAA President Myles Brand’s request for a recentered focus on positive commercialism).
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NCAA’s amateurism rules are largely flouted with impunity. This
discussion lays the foundation for a modified definition of
amateurism, described in Part IV, that better reflects the reality of
college sports.
A. Rules Protecting Amateurism
The theme of amateurism runs deeply throughout the NCAA’s
rules and bylaws. The organization’s constitution lists twin
amateurism goals: to develop and ensure compliance with satisfactory
53
standards of amateurism and “[t]o cooperate with other amateur
athletics organizations in promoting and conducting national and
54
international athletics events.” The “basic purpose” of the
organization’s “fundamental policy” is to retain a clear line of
demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and professional
55
sports. The NCAA relates this foundational goal to an educational
purpose and states that the clear line of demarcation comes from the
integration of the athlete into the student body and the placement of
56
athletics within the entire education system. The principle of
57
amateurism is thus a bedrock of the modern NCAA.
The NCAA’s direct regulation of amateurism falls into the two
previously denoted categories: the prevention of remuneration and
the creation of a barrier between amateur and professional athletics.
Other rules that indirectly maintain amateurism take the form of
paternalistic rules that govern the activity engaged in by athletes,
coaches, and agents.
1. No Pay. The no pay rules prevent the amateur athlete from
using his or her athleticism “directly or indirectly” for pay in any form
58
in that sport, accepting a promise of future pay (even if after
59
60
college), and receiving any form of financial assistance from anyone

53. NCAA MEMBERSHIP SERVS. STAFF, supra note 7, § 1.2.
54. Id.
55. Id. §§ 1.2–.3.
56. See id. (“A basic purpose of this Association is to maintain intercollegiate athletics as
an integral part of the educational program and the athlete as an integral part of the student
body and, by so doing, retain a clear line of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and
professional sports.”).
57. See supra notes 48–50 and accompanying text.
58. NCAA MEMBERSHIP SERVS. STAFF, supra note 7, § 12.1.2(a), (d).
59. Id. § 12.1.2(b).
60. Id. § 12.1.2, 12.3.1.1, 12.4–.5.
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61

with few exceptions. The rules strictly limit the financial aid or
benefits that the student may receive including academic aid, gifts
after the completion of eligibility, outside aid entirely for educational
purposes, research grants, and even basic travel or reimbursement of
62
expenses. The athlete cannot use his or her name, reputation, or
63
athletic popularity for pecuniary gain. Some of the restrictions may
simply be to close procedural loopholes likely to be abused, but a
number of the more draconian rules evoke the ideal of the selfless
unpaid Olympian, who was not even permitted to receive
64
reimbursement for time out of work to compete.
2. Clear Line of Demarcation. The NCAA holds the line
between professional and intercollegiate athletics largely by refusing
65
to permit student-athletes to express a profit motive. Many of the
ways that student-athletes would manifest their self-interest directly
collide with the NCAA’s motivational script for student-athletes. For
example, the NCAA significantly limits the ability of student-athletes
to hold themselves out as potential professional athletes through
66
limitations on draft entry (the no-draft rule). The organization
prohibits the signing of a contract or any commitment of any kind to
67
play professional athletics, competition on any professional athletics
68
team in that sport (even without pay), and any agreement with an
69
agent for representation and promotion.

61. See id. at 190 tbl.15-1 (identifying some types of financial aid that a student-athlete may
receive).
62. Id.
63. Id. §§ 12.4–.5 (limiting athlete employment and the promotional appearance or use of
student-athlete reputation).
64. See E.A. Glader, Restrictions Against “Broken-Time” to Open Olympics, in OLYMPISM
47, 47 (Jeffrey Segrave & Donald Chu eds., 1981) (describing payment for time away from a job
when “involved in practice for competition, competition itself, or traveling to or from
competition or practice” as “generally interpreted to be prohibited by the eligibility rules for the
Olympic Games.”).
65. See NCAA MEMBERSHIP SERVS. STAFF, supra note 7, §§ 12.1.2, 12.2.4–.5, 12.3–.6
(describing rules regarding employment, future employment, agents, draft entry, and bars
limiting the use of student-athlete reputation or image for commercial purposes).
66. See id. § 12.2.4 (setting forth rules on draft entry).
67. Id. § 12.1.2(c).
68. Id. §§ 12.1.2(e), 12.2.3.2.
69. Id. §§ 12.1.2(g), 12.3.
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3. Protection from Professionalism. The NCAA engages in a
70
parental monitoring of students’ outside pay, their agreements and
71
interactions with agents, and their interactions with coaches or
72
professional sports organizations. The goals are manifold, but at
least part of the motive in these rules is to preserve the purity of
73
college sport. Student play on other amateur teams is limited
74
individually by sport to vacation and out of season play. The
participation on any professional team renders a student ineligible for
75
the sport, even if the student received no pay. Colleges are
prohibited from using financial inducements, except approved
76
77
financial aid, in recruiting, and coach contact with students is
78
checked by a complex web of regulations. Professional negotiations
are limited by a combination of strategies including barring attorney
or agent contact with the professional team, prohibiting the presence
of the agent during negotiations, and strictly limiting the provision of
79
benefits from agents to student-athletes. Thus agreements between
student-athletes and agents are often left unstated and pushed
80
underground. Such rules attempt to enforce a sharp division
between professionalism and amateurism, and they purportedly
protect students from the business of sports. The results, however, are
81
of little benefit to athletes.

70. See id. § 12.1.2 (explaining in detail payments resulting in loss of amateur status).
71. See id. § 12.3 (regulating interactions with sports agents).
72. See id. § 12.2 (regulating involvement with professional teams).
73. Id. § 1.3.2 (“A basic purpose of this Association is to . . . retain a clear line of
demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and professional sports.”). The NCAA has also
vigorously argued in court that its rules are necessary to safeguard amateurism. See, e.g.,
NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 117 (1984) (“It is reasonable to assume that most of the
regulatory controls of the NCAA are justifiable means of fostering competition among amateur
athletic teams . . . .”); Wendy T. Kirby & T. Clark Weymouth, Antitrust and Amateur Sports:
The Role of Noneconomic Values, 61 IND. L.J. 31, 40 (1985) (“The NCAA defended [sanctions
against a football team] as necessary to preserve amateurism in intercollegiate athletics.
(discussing Justice v. NCAA, 577 F. Supp. 356 (D. Ariz. 1983))).
74. See NCAA MEMBERSHIP SERVS. STAFF, supra note 7, § 17 (explaining regulations
regarding the playing seasons and when, by sport, student-athletes may participate on other
amateur teams).
75. Id. §§ 12.1.2(e), 12.2.3.2.
76. Id. § 13.2.1.
77. Id. § 13.1.
78. See id. art. 13 (listing rules for recruiting).
79. Id. § 12.3.
80. See infra Part II.B.
81. See infra Part II.B.
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82

“[A]s few thoughtful observers doubt, [intercollegiate football
and men’s basketball at major NCAA institutions] are fantastically
83
commercial and decidedly not amateur.” Although those singing the
dirge for lost amateurism are premature in their mourning, the
realistic observer will note extraordinary amounts of money changing
hands, fierce competition among collegiate athletes for professional
opportunities, and the wholesale flouting of many rules that are
intended to promote and preserve amateurism.
84
College sports is a $60 billion industry. Arguing that
85
intercollegiate athletics “form a thoroughly commercial enterprise,”
observers have documented the economic benefit from March
Madness, Bowl Games, promotions, and the commercial use of
athletes’ images to the NCAA, conferences, colleges, coaches, and
86
corporations.
The fruits of athletic labor are disbursed through a web of
beneficiaries, and the dollar figures are staggering. The NCAA
reported revenues of $558.2 million for the 2005–2006 academic year,
approximately $471 million of which inured from the sale of
87
broadcast rights. The Atlantic Coast Conference alone generated
$148.9 million in the same period and distributed over $120 million to
88
its member schools. In turn with astronomical revenues, athletic
department budgets have ballooned: at Division I universities, the
growth in athletic budgets has outpaced the growth in overall
89
spending at a rate of over two-to-one. Finally, individuals employed
by college athletic departments have also benefited from the immense
popularity of intercollegiate athletics: “[t]he average salary, excluding

82. The term is often used to identify the hypocrisy of the ideal of amateurism when
viewed in the broader context of the commercial realities of sport. See, e.g., Michael S. Straubel,
Doping Due Process: A Critique of the Doping Control Process in International Sport, 106 DICK.
L. REV. 523, 570 n.301 (2002) (defining shamateurism as “the gap in the former rules that
allowed ‘amature’ [sic] athletes to get paid under the table”).
83. McCormick & McCormick, supra note 17, at 496.
84. Id. at 496–97.
85. Id. at 505.
86. Id. at 509–44.
87. Id. at 510.
88. Id. at 511–12.
89. See id. at 520 (“For example, from 1995 through 2001, athletic budgets at Division I
schools increased by twenty-five percent while overall spending at those institutions rose by
only ten percent.”).
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benefits, incentives, and other perquisites, for [coaches] in the elite
basketball conferences—the ACC, Big 12, Big East, Big Ten, Pacific
90
10, and SEC—is $1.2 million per year.” For example, Roy Williams,
the basketball coach at the University of North Carolina at Chapel
91
Hill, earns an average of $2.6 million annually, excluding his
lucrative promotional deals with such major corporations as Coca92
Cola.
Given the multi-million dollar salaries of their coaches, it is not
unexpected that the players themselves dream of large signing
bonuses and lucrative athletic shoe deals. Six hours before the deal
deadline, the number one overall pick in the 2007 Major League
Baseball draft, Vanderbilt left-handed pitcher David Price, signed a
93
six-year contract with the Tampa Bay Devil Rays for $8.5 million. In
94
2009, San Diego State University right-handed pitcher Stephen
Strasburg signed with the Nationals for a record $15.1 million in total
95
guaranteed pay. For the most talented collegiate athletes, college
play can resemble major league tryouts with ever-escalating potential
salaries and bonuses.
With so much money on the line, it is no surprise that many
NCAA rules are worked around or widely flouted. The NCAA is
constantly forced to alter its rules to close loopholes that open; at
times, it seems as though the NCAA is “governing out of a covered
96
wagon.” For example, a recruiting phone call ban led to a barrage of
e-mail and text messages requesting that recruits call the coaches of
97
their own initiative. But not all coaches go to such lengths to violate
90. Id. at 530.
91. Id.
92. See Keith Jarrett, Coke Ad Features Carolina’s Williams: Commercial Centers on
Coach’s Childhood Playing Ball in Asheville, ASHEVILLE CITIZEN-TIMES, Feb. 28, 2007, at A1
(describing a Coca-Cola commercial featuring Roy Williams).
93. Tyler Hissey, Devil Rays Agree to Terms with David Price, RAYSDIGEST.COM, Aug. 15,
2007, http://rays.scout.com/2/668823.html.
94. Player Bio: Stephen Strasburg, San Diego State Official Athletic Site,
http://goaztecs.cstv.com/sports/m-basebl/mtt/strasburg_stephen00.html (last visited Oct. 24,
2009).
95. Jim Callis, The Strasburg and Ackley Deals, BASEBALL AM., Aug. 17, 2009,
http://www.baseballamerica.com/blog/draft/?p=1724.
96. Mark Kreidler, There Are Always Ways Around a Phone Ban, ESPN.COM, May 26,
2006, http://sports.espn.go.com/ncb/columns/story?columnist=kreidler_mark&id=2459290.
97. See id. (satirizing the resulting flouting of the ban). Ignoring the rules is how the game
is played. In holding up a mirror to truth, one satirist wrote:
I think Coach realizes that you have all my numbers, so don’t be afraid to use
them! As an official representative of Midwest U., I am free and clear to take your
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the intent of the rules without actually breaking them. Former
Indiana basketball coach Kelvin Sampson was sanctioned for making
98
577 extra calls to prospects after a phone ban was in place.
Previous scandals include secret booster clubs that raised money
for payments to football players and other similar rogue booster
99
tales. Emerging markets for athletes consistently rely on the flouting
of NCAA rules, and those who refuse to participate in the mutual
back scratching or winking-and-nodding are lambasted as poor
recruiters:
Tony Squire . . . said the state of North Carolina has become
“infested with street agents,” adding that “there is no question it has
changed. What is happening now, the kids are changing and people
are running around now offering kids stuff. Nowadays, if somebody
comes in with some money, ‘You come play with us and you don't
have
to
worry
about
anything
coming
from
your
pocket.’” . . . What’s more, the NCAA rules . . . are routinely
100
flouted.
101

The no-agent rule falls under all three rulemaking categories
associated with amateurism (preventing pay or benefits to athletes,
enforcing the clear line of demarcation between amateurism and
professional sports, and protecting the student-athlete from
exploitation) and is an example of a restrictive rule that has failed to
achieve the NCAA’s desired policy goals. The rule’s decline serves as
an example of overly restrictive and ineffective rules that define

calls any time you want to make them. Why, Coach might even be standing nearby
when your incoming call lights up my RAZR! And if he’s nearby, he might even be
able to hear what you’re saying if we should happen to go on speakerphone! Hint,
hint!
Id.
98. Bud Withers, Kelvin Sampson Takes Heat from All Over, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 21,
2008, at D4.
99. E.g., Fernando Dominguez, There’s Plenty to Share Blame for Northridge Football
Folly, L.A. TIMES, June 2, 2000, at D15 (providing background information on a series of
NCAA compliance problems suffered by California State University, Northridge, including an
unauthorized booster club providing benefits to athletes); Douglas S. Looney, Deep in Hot
Water in Stillwater, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, July 3, 1978, at 18, available at
http://vault.sportsillustrated.cnn.com/vault/article/magazine/MAG1093819/index.htm
(describing a secret Oklahoma State University athletics booster club).
100. Eric Prisbell & Steve Yanda, A Whole New Ballgame that Williams Won’t Play, WASH.
POST, Feb. 13, 2009, at E01.
101. The rule has provisions banning any agreements with agents, the presence of an outside
advisor during contract negotiations, and any benefits from agents. See supra Part II.A.2–3.
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amateurism in a way that is too tightly linked to the ideal of
amateurism rather than a description of amateurism based in reality.
The flouting of the no-agent rule is perhaps most common in the
sport of baseball. In June of each year, the Major League Baseball
(MLB) draft occurs for high school prospects, rising and graduating
college seniors, underclassmen who meet age eligibility requirements,
102
and junior college players. Baseball compensation contracts can
have a few moving parts: a signing bonus, a contingency payment,
103
incentive bonus payments, and a college scholarship plan.
Negotiations with athletes may continue until the mid-August
104
deadline. If a deal is not reached by that point, the player has
chosen not to pursue the contract but to return to or enroll in college.
Yet the intricate contract negotiations usually begin long before the
draft.
A player’s draft potential is comprised of a number of factors.
Physical talent and long-term major league potential are the primary
105
factors. A player’s “makeup,” or a composite of character traits that
106
could affect his career, is another factor. The list is not complete,
107
however, without the additional factor of “signability.” Signability
matters primarily because draft picks are valuable tools for building
the best farm system. To maximize its draft picks, a team must know
in advance the likelihood that it will reach an acceptable deal with the
draft prospect. Players that seem likely to return to or enroll in
college, to choose to play for a professional team in another sport, or
to request a sum of money that is higher than their value to the team,

102. Richard T. Karcher, The NCAA’s Regulations Related to the Use of Agents in the Sport
of Baseball: Are the Rules Detrimental to the Best Interest of the Amateur Athlete?, 7 VAND. J.
ENT. L. & PRAC. 215, 219 (2005).
103. Id. at 220.
104. See John Manuel, Signing Deadline Didn’t End Draft Intrigue, BASEBALL AM., Aug.
27, 2008, http://www.baseballamerica.com/today/draft/news/2008/266761.html (providing an
example of end-game draft deadline negotiations).
105. Interview with Aaron Fitt, National Writer, Baseball Am., in Durham, N.C. (Mar. 3,
2009).
106. Id.
107. Signability is the likelihood that a player will sign a contract for an amount that a team
is willing to pay. E.g., Jim Callis, Mauer, Prior Rekindle One Versus Two Debate, BASEBALL
AM., Sept. 12, 2003, http://www.baseballamerica.com/today/minors/030912mauerpoy_callis.html;
Kevin Gorman, “Signability” a Factor for Pirates, PITTSBURGH TRIB., June 7, 2007; Ken
Gurnick, Signability Is Key for Dodgers’ Draft Plan, MLB.COM, June 6, 2006,
http://mlb.mlb.com/news/article.jsp?ymd=20060606&content_id=1492360; Farid Rushdi, MLB:
When Teams Draft Signability, Not Talent, BLEACHER REP., Jan. 2, 2009, http://bleacher
report.com/articles/100329-mlb-when-teams-draft-signability-not-talent.
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are often selected lower in the draft than raw talent would project.
At the same time, players need to maximize their bargaining power
and contract at a rate close to their market value. Without an agent to
communicate with the team, the student-athlete is at a disadvantage
in the draft selection and contract negotiation processes. College
players and their families are, for the most part, unsophisticated
parties conducting a one-time transaction across the table from a
sophisticated and well-staffed professional sports organization
seeking to minimize the signing bonuses and salaries of its prospects.
Thus, players who strictly follow the no-agent rule may face the
consequences of the unequal bargaining power. To some observers,
maintaining this bar against agent or attorney representation
109
produces unconscionable results.
“The NCAA is a bully, and they’ve been beating up on these
kids and these schools for years, and everybody’s been taking it. I
can’t believe people put up with it, I really can’t[,]” said Rick
Johnson, who mounted a successful multi-prong attack on the
NCAA’s no-agent rule in the Andy Oliver case, winning an injunction
110
as well as a $750,000 settlement after an initial ruling on the merits.
The systematic flouting of some rules suggests two things. First,
the rules fail to reflect the realities of a changing perception of
amateurism. Second, the rules may be too numerous, complicated, or
difficult to enforce. The corrosion of the no-agent rule was speeded
by its unenforceability, widespread disobedience (at least in the case
of baseball, for which the timing of the draft before the conclusion of
the season made it essential for players to contract with agents before

108. Matt Blood, Ability, Not Signability, BASEBALL AM., June 6, 2008,
http://www.baseballamerica.com/today/draft/news/2008/266305.html.
109. See Fitt, supra note 1, at 8 (“You’re talking about a huge business issue that nobody
should expect some amateur player coming out of high school or college to be able to deal with
on their own.”).
110. Fitt, supra note 12; Aaron Fitt, Oliver Wins Suit Against NCAA, BASEBALL AM., Feb.
12, 2009, http://www.baseballamerica.com/blog/college/?p=746. Additionally, one major league
scouting director noted:
[The NCAA] expects us to call and say, ‘Hey, we had a deal with this kid’s
adviser, but he went back into school?’ Come on, we’re not going to do that. Why do
we care? . . . You enforce it, or do something once you get ahold of it. It’s not that
hard to pick up a paper—you can read about it. The college coaches know these guys
are represented. You’d think the NCAA would get more involved if they care,
because we’re playing a charade here if we think these players are representing
themselves, and it’s just family advisers after they get drafted. That’s kind of a joke.
Fitt, supra note 1, at 8; see also id. (“It’s hard to tell just how much of an issue this is for the
NCAA, which seems to alternate between tough talk and blissful ignorance.”).
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their collegiate eligibility expired), harsh consequences for studentathletes even when followed, and intrusion into the attorney-client
relationship. From the player’s perspective, the risk analysis
associated with breaking the no-agent rule involves weighing the
possible but unlikely prospect of enforcement against the known
negative consequences of following the rule, and the “best” choice
may frequently be to break the amateurism rules.
III. AMATEURISM AND THE LAW
It is unclear where amateurism ends and professionalism begins.
The legal consequences of reaching that tipping point, however, could
be grave for the NCAA and universities that participate in
intercollegiate sport. Section A describes the broad legal framework,
developed by other authors, that the NCAA and universities must
consider. Section B lays the foundation for an analysis under tax law.
Tax exemptions are valuable to both colleges and the NCAA,
111
protecting billions in sports revenue from taxation. Both Sections
demonstrate, however, that the NCAA is likely at little risk of losing
its legal protections and suggest that a liberalized amateurism is
justified.
A. The Potential Risks of a Liberalized Amateurism: Traditional
Considerations
In its most apocalyptic incantation, the loss of the no-agent rule
and the muddied line of demarcation between amateur and
professional athletics have the potential to undermine legal
protections specific to amateurism. There are three primary areas of
112
the law in which amateurism matters: antitrust, labor, and tax.
The perceived susceptibility of the NCAA to antitrust challenges
113
has produced significant litigation and legal scholarship.
The
111. See supra text accompanying note 85.
112. See McCormick & McCormick, supra note 17, at 497 (identifying three areas of law
that shield colleges and the NCAA from regulation). Tax considerations are discussed and
further developed in Part III.B, infra.
113. E.g., Deborah E. Klein & William Buckley Briggs, Proposition 48 and the Business of
Intercollegiate Athletics: Potential Antitrust Ramifications Under the Sherman Act, 67 DENV. U.
L. REV. 301 (1990); Daniel E. Lazaroff, The NCAA in Its Second Century: Defender of
Amateurism or Antitrust Recidivist?, 86 OR. L. REV. 329 (2007); Daniel A. Rascher & Andrew
D. Schwarz, Neither Reasonable nor Necessary: “Amateurism” in Big-Time College Sports, 14
SPG ANTITRUST 51 (2000); Laura Freedman, Note, Pay or Play? The Jeremy Bloom Decision
and NCAA Amateurism Rules, 13 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 673 (2003);
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resulting rulings, however, tend toward a strong deference to the
NCAA for both commercial and noncommercial restrictions as well
114
as nearly universal acceptance of the NCAA’s amateurism defense.
115
In NCAA v. Board of Regents, the Court recognized that the
product of intercollegiate athletics inherently requires some restraint:
“[T]his case involves an industry in which horizontal restraints on
116
competition are essential if the product is to be available at all.” The
NCAA generally offers an amateurism defense, arguing that the
procompetitive value of amateurism, furthered by the restraints,
117
outweighs any anticompetitive effect. The no-draft and no-agent
rules are generally upheld as “[p]rotection[s] of amateurism” that are
118
resistant to antitrust challenges. Because the rules apply “short119
circuited” scrutiny, the courts thus exhibit a broad deference to the
120
NCAA on matters of amateurism. The strong educational mission
of the NCAA specifically and intercollegiate athletics generally help
121
the organization to survive challenges.
Thus, even a highly
deregulated version of amateurism would likely still constitute a valid
defense for rules challenged under antitrust law.
The NCAA is largely immune from workers’ compensation
claims, claims from athletes under employment law, and unionization

Benjamin A. Menzel, Comment, Heading Down the Wrong Road?: Why Deregulating
Amateurism May Cause Future Legal Problems for the NCAA, 12 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 857
(2002); Kristin R. Muenzen, Comment, Weakening Its Own Defense? The NCAA’s Version of
Amateurism, 13 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 257 (2003).
114. McCormick & McCormick, supra note 17, at 500–01. See generally Tibor Nagy, The
“Blind Look” Rule of Reason: Federal Courts’ Peculiar Treatment of NCAA Amateurism Rules,
15 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 331 (2005) (laying out the federal court trend of preferential treatment
of the NCAA in major decisions).
115. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
116. Id. at 100–01.
117. Muenzen, supra note 113, at 264.
118. Id. at 269.
119. Id.
120. Rascher & Schwarz, supra note 113, at 53 (“[I]n later cases . . . the courts have used
NCAA v. Board of Regents as a starting point, reading Supreme Court dicta as evidence that
amateurism itself has passed the reasonableness test, moving forward to evaluate specific
follow-on rules designed to support amateurism. These cases analyze whether the NCAA’s rules
are reasonable and necessary for preserving amateurism, not if amateurism itself is reasonable
and necessary.” (footnote omitted)); Muenzen, supra note 113, at 268–75.
121. See Rascher & Schwarz, supra note 113, at 53 (noting that the Supreme Court indicated
“academic affiliation is what differentiates NCAA football from NFL football, and thus creates
a market”).
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122

efforts by college athletes. The reasoning supporting these broad
immunities is largely grounded in the NCAA’s emphasis on education
and amateurism. After a few early cases protecting student-athletes as
123
employees, the ground shifted and the notion was cleanly rejected.
The authoritative line of workers’ compensation cases have routinely
failed to extend statutes to student-athletes due at least in part to
124
their amateur status. Likewise, the NLRB is reluctant to extend
statutory protection to students who are also employees in other
125
contexts.
On the labor front, Professors McCormick and McCormick have
argued that the NCAA’s self-coined and much advertised term
“student-athlete” allows the NCAA to perpetuate the amateurism
myth and “obtain the astonishing pecuniary gain and related benefits
of the athletes’ talents, time, and energy—that is, their labor—while
126
severely curtailing the costs associated with such labor.” These
professors cast the NCAA in the role of the “company store” that
127
forces many of its workers to live below the poverty line.
Focusing on the distinct tests to determine the commercial
nature of an employee relationship under common law, professors
McCormick and McCormick find that certain college athletes are de
128
facto “employees.” The common law test examines the degree of
control the alleged employer maintained over the working life of the
alleged employee, and occasionally the “economic realities” of the
129
relationship are considered. McCormick and McCormick argue that
the daily lives of student-athletes demonstrate the control that the
130
university has over them.
The student-athlete’s grant-in-aid
functions as compensation, and student-athletes are economic

122. Robert A. McCormick & Amy Christian McCormick, The Myth of the Student-Athlete:
The College Athlete as Employee, 81 WASH. L. REV. 71, 80–81 (2006).
123. See Van Horn v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 33 Cal. Rptr. 169, 172 (Ct. App. 1963)
(finding the student-athlete to be an employee of his university); Univ. of Denver v. Nemeth,
257 P.2d 423, 430 (Colo. 1953) (holding that a student-athlete’s participation on a college
football team is within the scope of employment as an employee of the university).
124. McCormick & McCormick, supra note 17, at 498 n.16.
125. See Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483, 483 (2004) (holding that teaching and research
assistants are not employees of their respective universities when they are primarily students).
126. McCormick & McCormick, supra note 122, at 74.
127. Id. at 78–79.
128. Id. at 79.
129. Id. at 90–92.
130. For an account documenting the degree of control that coaches exercise over the lives
of student-athletes in big-time sports, see id., supra note 122, at 98–118.
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131

dependents. Assuming that this argument stands a reasonable
132
chance of success, the NCAA may fear the impending applicability
of labor law.
Although student-athletes seem to fit within the common law
133
definition of employee, the NLRB’s Brown University decision
indicates that the educational context changes the overall analysis.
The test articulated by the NLRB in the Brown University case
requires something other than the traditional “right of control”
134
threshold of student-employees. Looking at the overall character of
the employer-employee relationship, the board uses a four-factor test
to categorize the relationship as either primarily educational or
135
primarily economic. Under the first factor, the alleged employee’s
status as a student weighs against recognizing the relationship as one
136
of an employer-employee. The second factor examines the role of
137
the activity within education.
The third factor evaluates the
138
relationship with faculty. The fourth and final factor of the test
considers whether the student has received financial support from the
institution, which may weigh in favor of a primarily educational,
139
rather than commercial, relationship.
If the context of the employer-employee relationship is primarily
140
educational, labor protections are unlikely to apply. Professors
McCormick and McCormick suggest that some college athletes
qualify as employees even under the more restrictive Brown four-

131. Id. at 117.
132. The applicability of this test is further discussed in Part IV.A, infra.
133. Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483 (2004).
134. See id. at 492 (“Moreover, even if graduate student assistants are statutory employees,
a proposition with which we disagree, it simply does not effectuate the national labor policy to
accord them collective bargaining rights, because they are primarily students.”); id. at 490 n.27
(explaining that graduate student assistants are not subject to control by a university in return
for payment, but rather that their employment is focused primarily on furthering their own
learning experience).
135. Id. at 489, 492; see also McCormick & McCormick, supra note 122, at 120 (describing
the four-factor test to determine a student’s employee status).
136. Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. at 489, 492.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 489.
139. Id. at 489, 492.
140. See id. at 489–90, 492 (describing and applying the four-factor test used to determine
that labor protections did not apply because “the overall relationship between the graduate
student assistants and Brown [University] is primarily an educational one, rather than an
economic one”).
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141

factor statutory test. Yet even if the relationship between athletes
and their institutions is conclusively shown to be of a commercial
142
nature, the threshold that the relationship is primarily commercial
rather than educational is much more difficult to meet. Given this
problem of characterization, the McCormicks’ argument seems
unlikely to find success in the current legal climate. Thus, it is unlikely
that the balance against the potential unionization of college athletes
and the potential application of labor laws to the NCAA and colleges
143
will be altered.
B. Working the Officials: Analysis of Amateurism and the IRS
Given the existing scholarship on antitrust and labor law, this
Note largely focuses on the potential tax law consequences for the
NCAA of an evolving definition of amateurism. The boundaries of
tax law exemptions, perhaps the most important legal exemption for
the NCAA, are described in this Section. Generally, there are two
major taxes from which the NCAA and its member schools are
exempt. First, the NCAA and its member schools are exempt from
income taxes, which are widely applicable to commercial enterprises,
144
including professional sports organizations.
The second tax
exemption applicable to the NCAA and its member schools is the
Unrelated Business Income Tax (UBIT), which taxes otherwise
exempt organizations on income from a regularly operated trade or
145
business.
The NCAA is exempt from income taxes as an Internal Revenue
146
Code § 501(c)(3) organization. An amateur sports organization can

141. McCormick & McCormick, supra note 122, at 120–55.
142. See McCormick & McCormick, supra note 17, at 505–44 (arguing that intercollegiate
athletics are essentially commercial).
143. Cf. Rohith A. Parasuraman, Note, Unionizing NCAA Division I Athletics: A Viable
Solution?, 57 DUKE L.J. 727, 750–52 (2008) (recommending that the National Labor Review
Board not allow unionization of college athletes in favor of congressional policy determination).
144. Josh Centor, House Committee Member Questions Tax-Exempt Status for College
Sports, NCAA NEWS, Oct. 23, 2006, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/ncaa?key=/ncaa/ncaa/
ncaa+news/ncaa+news+online/2006/associationwide/house+committee+member+questions+tax
exempt+status+for+college+sports+-+10-23-06+ncaa+news (“As a practical matter, educational
organizations like the NCAA and its member schools are entitled to income tax exemption as
charitable organizations, just like hospitals or churches.”).
145. I.R.C. §§ 501(b), 511–14 (2006).
146. Letter from Myles Brand, President, NCAA, to William Thomas, Chairman, H. Comm.
on Ways and Means 1 (Nov. 13, 2006), http://www.ncaa.org/wps/ncaa?ContentID=44636 (follow
“The NCAA’s Response to Chairman Thomas’ Letter” hyperlink).
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qualify as an exempt organization on four possible grounds: that the
organization serves an educational purpose; that the organization is
charitable in nature; that “[t]he organization is organized and
operated to foster national or international amateur sports
competition, but does not provide athletic facilities or equipment;” or
that the organization is a “qualified amateur sports organization”
147
under I.R.C. § 501(j). The NCAA likely qualifies as both an
148
149
educational organization and as an amateur athletics organization,
but its argument for tax-exempt status is factually strongest under the
150
amateur athletics organization provision. The 501(j) exemption
allows the amateur athletics organization to be a 501(c)(3) exempt
organization and applies to “any organization organized and operated
exclusively to foster national or international amateur sports
competition if such organization is also organized and operated
primarily to conduct national or international competition in sports or
to support and develop amateur athletes for national or international
151
competition in sports.” The classification excludes local recreational
leagues and such professional leagues as the NFL, NHL, MLB, and
152
NBA.
For charitable organizations, an unrelated business is subject to a
separate tax when it is (1) a trade or business, (2) regularly carried on,
and (3) not substantially related to further the exempt purposes of the
153
organization. Under the third factor of the unrelated business test,
the term “substantially related” has been debated in the context of

147. I.R.C. § 501(j); INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL § 4.76.12.3
(2003).
148. Although the prudence of the presumption has been disputed, there is a congressional
presumption that athletics are substantially related to an educational mission. Morgan, supra
note 52, at 160–62. For a discussion of the NCAA’s education argument, see Letter from Myles
Brand to William Thomas, supra note 146, at app. A.
149. Letter from Myles Brand to William Thomas, supra note 146, app. A at 14–18.
150. Such a statement assumes the, perhaps unlikely, possibility that the congressional
presumption may shift.
151. I.R.C. § 501(j).
152. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 147, §§ 4.76.12.3.1–.4 (describing the
examination process for determining whether an organization is an exempt amateur sports
organization); Id. § 7.25.26.4 (describing legislative intent to keep recreational leagues nonexempt). Although the NFL is exempt under other provisions, Duff Wilson, NFL Executives
Hope to Keep Salaries Secret, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2008, such an arrangement would be
insufficient for the NCAA to achieve its broader purpose of protecting its member schools. See
supra note 18.
153. I.R.C. § 513(a) (2006).
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154

the NCAA’s commercialization; despite the colloquy, momentum
has not shifted in favor of taxing NCAA income. The consequences
of such a shift, however, could have far-reaching impacts for both the
155
NCAA and its member universities. It is thus important for the
NCAA to work within the boundaries of tax law exemptions in
defining amateurism.
The NCAA clings tightly to the clear line of demarcation, but
much of the organization’s rules, exhibiting a death grip on the old
amateurism paradigm, are likely unnecessary for tax purposes. Over
the years, the IRS has developed a line of commentary that yields a
very deferential standard of amateurism in sport. The IRS’s
amateurism opinions are available in cases and revenue rulings as
well as nonbinding agency letter rulings or internal manuals; the sum
of these parts provides a generally reliable vision of the IRS’s
amateurism. The following analysis adds to the current research in
the area and proceeds along five paths: skill, athlete pay and benefits,
classification, commercialization and public benefit, and legal
interpretations of amateurism.
1. Skill. The colloquial definition of amateurism often divides
professionals and amateurs on the basis of skill; an amateur may be a
dabbler, a person who has not gained the level of proficiency
expected of a professional or is lacking in experience or mastery of
156
fundamentals. Perhaps recognizing that in the Olympics and other
international competitions amateur status is rarely associated with
157
skill, the IRS does not connect amateurism to a lower skill level. In

154. See, e.g., Letter from Bill Thomas, Chairman, H. Comm. on Ways and Means, to Myles
Brand, President, NCAA (Oct. 2, 2006), reprinted in Letter from Myles Brand to William
Thomas, supra note 146, app. C at 6 (exploring how the commercialization of the NCAA men’s
basketball championship “further[s] the educational purpose of the NCAA and its member
institutions”); Letter from Myles Brand to William Thomas, supra note 146, at 21–22
(responding that the telecasting of NCAA events does not make “the purpose of intercollegiate
athletics anything other than educational in nature for those who participate”); see also Morgan,
supra note 52, at 154–62 (explaining the UBIT factors, describing congressional presumptions
favorable to the NCAA, and discussing IRS opposition to these presumptions).
155. For examples of the commercial proceeds from intercollegiate athletics that benefit the
NCAA, conferences, and member institutions, see discussion supra Part II.B.
156. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, supra note 20, at
55.
157. See Media Sports League, Inc. v. Comm’r, 52 T.C.M. (CCH) 1093, 1093 (1986)
(distinguishing the non-exempt petitioner from an exempt amateur sports league on the grounds
that the petitioner “provides no formal or ongoing instruction to its members, has no skill
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fact, the presumption is that amateurs are highly skilled players. In
distinguishing social leagues developed for personal recreational
benefit from amateur organizations, the level of skill required for
159
amateurs is assumed to be much higher. Recruitment of the best
athletes, official skills training, and skill prerequisites for play are
viewed as a public good and encouraged for the furtherance of
160
sport. Thus, amateurism need not be viewed as a ladder-step
precursor to professionalism, and leagues that contain players of
sufficient skill to play professionally are still amateur leagues.
2. Athlete Pay and Benefits. Payment matters. The NCAA’s
efforts to withhold the private benefits of intercollegiate play from
student-athletes, however, likely extend beyond the requirements of
the IRS. The only two remuneration schemes that seem to be firmly
against principles of amateurism are paying athletes a substantial
161
formal salary for their play
and sharing gate receipts from
162
intercollegiate sports with the players.
Other forms of
compensation, largely prohibited by NCAA regulations, are likely
much less problematic from the government’s perspective. Although

requirements for eligibility to play in its leagues and does not require members to participate in
any of its activities”).
158. See id. (distinguishing the amateur sports organization from another organization
seeking to further “amateur athletics” but having a “substantial purpose” to “further the social
and recreational interests of its members”).
159. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 147, § 7.25.26.4(1) (“Congress did not
intend to grant exemption to social clubs or to organizations of casual athletes or organizations
whose primary purposes are the recreation of their members.” (citing 122 CONG. REC. 25,961
(1976) (statement of Sen. Culver))).
160. See id. § 7.25.26.4(3) (“The following factors are indicators that an organization is not
primarily social and/or recreational but rather promotes serious competition in the manner
contemplated by the two statutes . . . . (C) The caliber of the athletes makes them serious
contenders for the Olympic or Pan American Games. (D) The athletes must demonstrate a
certain level of talent and achievement in order to receive support from the organization. (E)
The organization provides intensive, daily training, as distinguished from sponsoring only
weekend events open to and attracting a broad range of competitors. (F) The organization
devotes itself to improving the performance of a small group of outstanding athletes rather than
emphasizing improvement in the health of the general public.”).
161. See id. § 7.25.26.7 (recognizing, but not addressing, the question of private inurement).
162. See id. § 7.25.26.8(1) (“The nonprofit organization distributed approximately 95
percent of the net gate receipts among the players as players’ splits or shares pursuant to
individual contracts entered into between the corporation and the players. The operation of a
semiprofessional baseball club is ordinarily a commercial activity and not exempt from federal
income taxation under IRC 501(c)(4). Rev. Rul. 55–516, 1955–2 C.B. 260, distinguished by Rev.
Rul. 69–384, 1969–2 C.B. 122.”).
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they produce taxable income for the student-athlete, scholarships
164
for the full cost of attendance do not jeopardize amateur status.
Likewise, neither nominal monetary awards for participation in
intercollegiate games nor the provision of housing expenses evoke
165
IRS suspicion regarding the public benefit of the organization.
166
And even for
Small stipends also seem unobjectionable.
international athletes, the unreimbursed taxpayer provision of
athletes’ lodging, transportation, and meals is explicitly tax167
deductible.
Most surprisingly, the guarantee of jobs for participation in sport,
so long as the athletes are paid for their work and not their play on
the field, does not seem to trouble the IRS or the courts. In
Hutchinson Baseball Enterprises v. Commissioner of Internal
168
Revenue, a semiprofessional team told prospective players “that
employment will be found for them during the Broncos season, and
169
that the pay will be at least minimum wage.” The jobs were typically
170
manual labor, including roofing, insulation, and yardwork. “A few
players are employed full time by petitioner. These players are given
field maintenance jobs—picking up trash, cleaning restrooms and
bleachers, mowing and watering the field, and repairing the field
171
surface.”
Here, it is important to note that the low-paying jobs

163. Scholarships beyond the cost of tuition, fees, and required books and supplies are
taxable
income.
Internal
Revenue
Serv.,
Taxable
Income
for
Students,
http://www.irs.gov/individuals/students/article/0,,id=96674,00.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2009).
164. See Letter from Myles Brand to William Thomas, supra note 146, app. A at 11 (“An
organization that grants scholarships to students furthers educational purposes.” (citing Rev.
Rul. 69-257, 1969-1 C.B. 151; Rev. Rul. 66-103, 1966-1 C.B. 134)).
165. See Mobile Arts & Sports Ass’n v. United States, 148 F. Supp. 311, 315–16 (S.D. Ala.
1957) (holding that an organization is tax exempt even where each member of a winning team is
paid five hundred dollars and each member of the losing team is paid four hundred dollars);
Hutchinson Baseball Enters. v. Comm’r, 73 T.C. 144, 155 (1979), aff’d, 696 F.2d 757 (10th Cir.
1982) (holding that an exempt amateur sports league can provide housing and employment to
amateur players).
166. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 147, § 7.25.26.7 (“The forms of support
may include stipends, payment of living expenses, housing, and scholarships.”).
167. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8121070 (Feb. 26, 1981) (“[T]axpayers in the host families [for
international amateur athletes] are entitled to deduct as charitable contributions, the
unreimbursed out of pocket expenses paid for the meals, transportation and lodging of visiting
competitors . . . .”).
168. Hutchinson Baseball Enters. v. Comm’r, 73 T.C. 144 (1979), aff’d, 696 F.2d 757 (10th
Cir. 1982).
169. Id. at 148.
170. Id.
171. Id.
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corresponded directly with rates for manual labor. Abusing this
permissive approach by arranging sweetheart deals that set players up
with highly paid consulting positions would likely be met with great
skepticism by both the agency and reviewing judges.
3. Classification. For purposes of amateurism, it matters little if
the
organization
is
called
amateur,
professional,
or
172
semiprofessional. The word “semiprofessional” in either the title of
the league or the competition is, of course, not conclusive proof that
the organization is not amateur. In short, it does not matter what the
organization is called; there is no magic language. It is instead the
characteristics of the athletic organization that define amateur status
for tax purposes.
4. Commercialization and the Public Benefit. Much has been
written about the commercialization of intercollegiate athletics and
173
the potential ramifications in antitrust or tax law. It is true that
extraordinary sums of money are traded and entire industries thrive
on the existence of intercollegiate athletics. Yet the government does
not view such actions as objectionably commercial.
Similarly, IRS agents have refused to overly concern themselves
with the commercial enterprise of sport. Instead of fees charged or
revenue collected, it is the public benefit that is of the greatest
174
concern to the IRS. Congress finds benefit not only in the
competition of sport on the field but also in the broader development
175
of sport. This public policy is closely analogous to the public value
of access, awareness, and participation in the arts.

172. Id. at 154 (“Tax law does not rely on labels to determine taxability.”). The NCAA,
however, defines as professional any organization that “[d]eclares itself to be professional.”
NCAA MEMBERSHIP SERVS. STAFF, supra note 7, § 12.02.4).
173. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
174. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200832034 (May 14, 2008) (“[T]he broadcasting of these athletic
events promotes the various amateur sports, fosters public interest in the benefits of its
nationwide amateur athletic program, and encourages public participation. Therefore, its sale of
broadcasting rights and the resulting broadcasting of its athletic events contributes importantly
to the accomplishment of its exempt purposes.” (citing Rev. Rul. 80-295, 1980-2 C.B. 194)).
175. Rev. Rul. 80-296, 1980-2 C.B. 196 (“[T]he educational purposes served by exhibiting a
game before an audience that is physically present and exhibiting the game on television or
radio before a much larger audience are substantially similar. Therefore, the sale of the
broadcasting rights and the resultant broadcasting of the game contributes importantly to the
accomplishment of the organization’s exempt purposes.”). These rulings, however, are premised
on the educational purposes of the organization. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH
CONG., HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT AND PRESENT LAW OF THE FEDERAL TAX EXEMPTION
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When the tax-exempt goal of the organization is to promote
awareness of and participation in amateur sports, the IRS has ruled
that the sale of broadcasting rights to those amateur sports events is
176
177
not taxable. The revenue need not be nominal. The IRS rulings on
this issue also indicate the probability that all sports-related business
conducted by the NCAA is unlikely to be subject to the UBIT.
5. Interpreting Amateurism. The IRS’s evaluation of exempt
organizations is guided by the Internal Revenue Manual (IRM). The
IRM suggests that the IRS views the term “amateur sports
organizations,” particularly under § 501(j), as analogous to the terms
178
of the Amateur Sports Act.
The Act defines amateurs by
incorporating the definitions of the national governing body (NGB)
179
associated with the particular sport. The NGBs are thus given
substantial deference for defining amateurism under both the
Amateur Sports Act and the IRS interpretations.
The NGBs are largely autonomous, nongovernmental
organizations that work with the United States Olympic Committee
to administer Olympic teams and represent the United States within
international sports federations. These organizations are also
empowered to “establish national goals and encourage the attainment
180
of those goals” and to “serve as the coordinating body for amateur
181
athletic activity in the United States.” Of the major American
Olympic sports (there is no national governing body for American
football), the designated national governing bodies are USA
182
Basketball, USA Baseball, USA Hockey, and USA Soccer.
FOR CHARITIES AND OTHER TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 146–47 (Comm. Print 2005),
available at http://www.jct.gov/x-29-05.pdf.
176. Rev. Rul. 80-295, 1980-2 C.B. 194.
177. See id. (permitting the sale of national broadcast rights by a conference).
178. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 147, § 7.25.26.7 (“[An organization that pays
athletes without compromising their eligibility under the national governing body’s rules] fits
the definition of an amateur sports organization within the ambit of the Amateur Sports Act of
1978, which establishes the United States Olympic Committee and regulates the United States’
participation in the Olympic Games. The Congressional intent underlying both that Act and
IRC 501(j) is similar.”).
179. 36 U.S.C. § 220501(b)(1) (2006) (“‘[A]mateur athlete’ means an athlete who meets the
eligibility standards established by the national governing body or paralympic sports
organization for the sport in which the athlete competes.”).
180. 36 U.S.C. § 220523(a)(2) (2006).
181. Id. § 220523(a)(3).
182. See Team USA.org, Team USA, http://teamusa.org/ngb/sports?sport_type=summer
(last visited Oct. 23, 2009) (listing the national governing bodies for each summer sport); Team
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The Act is clear that the interpretation of amateurism is intended
to be broad; NGBs shall “not have eligibility criteria related to
amateur status or to participation in the Olympic Games, the
Paralympic Games or the Pan-American Games that are more
restrictive than those of the appropriate international sports
183
federation.” The government is furthermore unlikely to find rules
placing harsh restrictions on athletes’ autonomy as necessary for
maintenance of amateurism: “Athletes must be given the opportunity
to decide what is best for their athletic careers . . . . The decision
should not be dictated by an arbitrary rule which, in its application,
184
restricts, for no real purpose, an Athlete’s opportunity to compete.”
Finally, the USOC prohibits NGB rules “requiring an Athlete to
185
reveal the terms of a personal sponsor contract.”
For example, the USA Basketball’s amateurism rules are much
less restrictive than those of the NCAA. The NGB’s constitution
defines an amateur athlete as “an athlete who is eligible under FIBA
rules to compete in international Amateur Athletic Competitions
186
conducted under FIBA auspices.”
FIBA is the Fédération
Internationale de Basketball, an international amateur sports
organization. FIBA prohibits the pay of a player or team during the
Olympic Games, but it otherwise permits players to enter into written
187
contracts for payment with club teams.
Although excessive
professional-scale pay for amateur athletes in amateur competitions
would likely evoke private inurement concerns, it is clear that
stipends, living expenses, housing, and scholarships are all

USA.org, Team USA, http://teamusa.org/ngb/sports?sport_type=winter (last visited Oct. 23,
2009) (winter sports).
183. 36 U.S.C. § 220522(a)(14) (2006).
184. Letter from Jim Scherr, CEO, U.S. Olympic Comm., to Executive Dirs. and Presidents,
Nat’l Governing Bodies pt. A(5) (Nov. 8, 2005), http://teamusa.org/pages/4062 (quoting 1978
Senate Report on the Act).
185. Id. pt. C(4)(d).
186. USA BASKETBALL, CONSTITUTION OF USA BASKETBALL § 1.2 (2008), available at
http://www.usabasketball.com/inside.php?page=constitution.
187. FÉDÉRATION INTERNATIONALE DE BASKETBALL, INTERNAL REGULATIONS 2008:
REGULATION H RULES GOVERNING PLAYERS, COACHES, SUPPORT OFFICIALS, AND
PLAYERS’ AGENTS (2008), available at http://www.fiba.com/downloads/training/agents/
Eligibility_NationalStatus_International_Transfers_of_Players.pdf (“H.1.6 Players may enter
into a written contract with a club. This contract may state that the player will receive payment.;
H.1.7 Players who participate in professional leagues must belong to organisations which are
members of the member federation; otherwise they will not be able to participate in the official
competitions of FIBA; H.1.8 No financial remuneration for the performances of a player or a
team is permitted during the Olympic Games.”).
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permissible. Agents are permitted, but regulated; they are required to
188
have clear contractual terms and abide by ethical rulings.
In the baseball context, the demarcation line for amateurism is
similarly muddied. In simplest terms, an amateur is someone who is
189
not being paid for playing “professional” baseball.
But the
standards for who can compete and play in USA Baseball games
varies; “[w]e first introduced professional athletes into our
organization in 1999 with the Pan-American games, which was a
qualifier for the 2000 Olympic Games, and most recently have used
190
professional athletes in the 2008 Beijing Games.” Minor league
players are considered professionals and would be ineligible for some
191
national teams, but those national teams are subdivided by specific
192
class or age rather than amateur status. The NGB’s World Baseball
Classic team, on the other hand, includes such well-known
193
professionals as Derek Jeter and Kevin Youkilis.
In sum, to understand the IRS definition of amateurism, one
should look to the Amateur Sports Act, defining amateurism by
reference to the NGBs for each sport. Those NGBs may then defer to
the international organizations for guidance. The definitions used by
the NGBs and international organizations often provide a greater
degree of freedom to the amateur athlete and permit athletes to play
for pay in at least some contexts. The IRS permissiveness suggests
that the tax code intends amateurism to be defined broadly for bona
fide amateur organizations.

188. See FÉDÉRATION INTERNATIONALE DE BASKETBALL, INTERNAL REGULATIONS 2008:
RULES GOVERNING PLAYERS, COACHES, SUPPORT OFFICIALS, AND PLAYERS’ AGENTS, at
H.5.6.2.1(p), available at http://www.fiba.com/downloads/training/agents/Eligibility_Players_
Agents.pdf (stating that the agent’s duty is “to demonstrate integrity and transparency in all of
his dealings with the client”); id. Annex 1 to Regulation H5 (providing short standard contract
between player and agent).
189. The organization does not incorporate a definition of amateurism in its constitution or
bylaws, and the question is one that the organization had not previously confronted. If it were
confronted with this question, the organization would most likely defer to USOC and the
International Baseball Federation (IBAF). Telephone Interview with David Perkins, Chief
Operating Officer, USA Baseball (March 4, 2009) (“[What is an amateur] is a question that
we’ve never been asked before.”).
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. See USABaseball.com, http://web.usabaseball.com/index_a.jsp (follow “Teams”
hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 24, 2009) (listing collegiate team and teams divided by age).
193. USABaseball.com, 2009 World Baseball Classic Team Rosters, http://web.usabaseball.
com/events/events.jsp?ymd=20090507&content_id=36900&vkey=event_usab (last visited Oct.
24, 2009).
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IV. PLAYING THE GAME: PROPOSALS FOR REDEFINING
AMATEURISM IN INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS
A. The Legal Effect of Adopting a “New Amateurism”
The law has broadly painted the rough boundaries of
amateurism; the NCAA, on the other hand, has confined athletes to a
narrowly defined zone well within the bounds of law. Although the
NCAA’s version of amateurism need not perfectly overlap with the
Internal Revenue Service’s amateurism, the NCAA should use the
crumbling of its amateurism rules as an opportunity for liberalizing
amateurism and updating the concept.
A modernized definition of amateurism, described further in
Part B, would acknowledge the profit motive of college athletes
without permitting payment, discard onerous rules that serve no
practical purpose, and re-imagine rules to create true protections. A
redefined amateurism could be beneficial or neutral in the context of
NCAA legal protections. Courts and agencies are likely to continue
to defer to the congressional desire for legal insulation of amateur
194
sports and college athletics organizations. Although it may seem
counterintuitive, further deregulation of amateurism may actually
strengthen the NCAA’s antitrust and employment law position
without impacting its tax status.
First, the NCAA may be aided in its antitrust defense by further
deregulation of amateurism. The regulations maintaining amateurism
are anticompetitive measures, and the NCAA’s response to this
anticompetitive charge is that the measures serve the larger prosocial
purpose of amateurism. It seems improbable that the amateurism
defense would be significantly weakened by a redefinition of
195
amateurism; the principle of amateurism would still serve as an
important distinction between professional sports and college sports,
and whatever procompetitive or prosocial goals professedly served by
the maintenance of amateurism would still be served under a
broadened amateurism regime. Perhaps the most important
implication of this Note’s amateurism proposal is that it would reduce
the NCAA’s susceptibility to lawsuits. The limitations preventing

194. See supra Part III.A.
195. See Muenzen, supra note 113, at 286 (arguing that weakening amateurism may be
problematic for the NCAA’s antitrust defense but suggesting that “the NCAA would be wise to
limit the amount of economic restraints it places on its members”).
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student-athletes from making business contracts, promoting
themselves, or engaging in professional negotiations with adequate
counsel trigger antitrust concerns. Enforcement actions supporting
those often arbitrary anticompetitive rules are the typical predicate
for athlete-initiated antitrust challenges to the NCAA. Thus, a regime
that reduces the anticompetitive limitations on college athletes could
reduce the overall amount of litigation. Moreover, these changes
could bolster the NCAA’s argument that it imposes only reasonable
restraints on trade and that some restraints are absolutely necessary
to protect amateurism in intercollegiate athletics. Put simply,
reducing economic restraints would aid the NCAA in its own defense.
The second benefit of this Note’s amateurism proposal is that,
under a labor law analysis, both the common law and the Brown
factors would be more likely to favor the NCAA under a less
restrictive regime. The common law analysis, in which the most
important factor is the degree of control over the working life of the
alleged employee, would significantly change with a relaxation of the
amateurism rules. The NCAA would be much less likely to fail this
test under the rule changes this Note proposes. By permitting athletes
to work in largely unrestricted employment, play on other teams
during the summer for pay, and openly pursue future employment
with professional sports, the NCAA would reduce its control of the
working lives of its student-athletes and also reduce the athletes’
financial dependence upon the NCAA and its member institutions. In
one enforcement action, a student-athlete whose scholarship support
196
ran out was sanctioned for accepting free groceries. This example
illustrates the excessive control that the organization has over the
financial lives of the athletes and highlights the economic dependency
that underlies this relationship. Permitting student-athletes to have
greater freedom to pursue compensation and reasonably enhance
their economic position would fundamentally change the
characterization of the current relationship in a manner that favors
labor law protections for the NCAA.
Similarly, relaxed amateurism rules would further solidify the
NCAA’s ability to satisfy the Brown criteria. Athletes would still be
required to maintain full-time student status, satisfying the test’s first
prong, and the sport’s role in education would likewise remain static.
196. Parasuraman, supra note 143, at 728 (citing Steve Springer, Edwards Suspended for
One Game; UCLA: Linebacker Ordered to Pay Restitution for $150 Worth of Groceries Left at
His Apartment, Allegedly by Agent, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1995, at C4).
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But under a regime limiting intense control over the students’ daily
lives, the relationship with faculty and coaches would shift in a way
that favors the NCAA in a Brown balancing test. This shift would
favor the NCAA because it is the relationship, and not the time
commitment, that weighs in the balance. The financial support given
by the institution to the athlete would also help to anchor the
NCAA’s ability to satisfy the final prong of the four-factor Brown
test. The grants-in-aid and scholarship system is, operationally, the
197
exclusive opportunity for some athletes to earn income, driving the
relationship between an institution and its athletes closer to an
employer-employee relationship. Under the current system, the
institution seems to provide payment for exclusive control of the
athlete’s physical labor. This is particularly true when contrasted with
the general student population who may work independently,
unfettered by restrictions on their most marketable skills, and may
trade on their names and reputations. By giving student-athletes the
economic autonomy that most college students enjoy, the NCAA can
remove itself from the role of financial dictator and eliminate the
appearance of an employer-employee relationship.
Additionally, the IRS provides wide latitude for a redefinition of
amateurism within bounds of a favorable tax status. Thus, these
antitrust and labor justifications, in addition to the tax analysis
provided in Part III, suggest that the NCAA can and should broaden
the scope of amateurism and create a less restrictive regime.
B. Redefining Amateur
It is important to recognize that the modern NCAA scheme is a
product of liberalization. There is, however, much room for
improvement. With respect to NCAA sports that have analogous
professional organizations, the amateur should simply be defined as
one who does not currently play for a professional team in that sport,
does not receive a salary or compensation tied to intercollegiate play
in excess of basic living expenses and tuition, and is a full-time
student in good standing.
Such a fundamental redefinition through simplification would be
beneficial for a number of reasons. First, the NCAA’s
acknowledgement of student-athletes’ profit motive would
197. The time demand of big-time college athletics makes employment during the season
difficult. See McCormick & McCormick, supra note 122, at 98–108 (documenting some of the
time demands on college football and basketball players).
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accommodate opportunities for professional growth. Second, rule
changes would reduce the quantity of unenforceable and overly
restrictive rules that endanger the legitimacy of all of the NCAA’s
rules because of their arbitrary enforcement. Third, a less restrictive
rule-making ethic would permit the NCAA to better fulfill its
organizational goals by substituting rules that are actually in the best
interests of the student-athlete for the present system of paternalistic
authoritarianism. Changes to less restrictive rules would also be
beneficial to the NCAA in reducing litigation and bolstering the
NCAA’s defenses in both the labor and antitrust law contexts.
1. For Love of the Game: Acknowledging the Profit Motive. The
benevolent athlete is no longer the hallmark of sport. When fourteentime Olympic gold medalist Michael Phelps was photographed with a
marijuana bong, his most serious consequence was not the threemonth ban on competitive swimming imposed on him by USA
Swimming but the potential impact of the incident on his
198
sponsorships. Prominent American athletes are often wealthy
celebrities. Shaquille O’Neal, for example, had the capital to offer his
199
own mortgage bailout plan to Orlando residents. Tiger Woods and
Michael Jordan are among the masters of athletic cross-promotion.
Being paid for their skill has not negatively impacted the public’s
view of these athletes’ fidelity to the ideal of sport, and some very
200
highly paid athletes are even considered to embody that ideal.
The profit motive, spurred by the cultural status and wealth of
such star celebrity athletes, is a powerful incentive for many college
athletes. Athletics is viewed as a way of paying for college, and many
athletes incorporate athletics into their future financial planning.
More than one in five Division I male athletes hope to play

198. See Phelps Suspended from Competition, Dropped by Kellogg, CNN.COM, Feb. 6, 2009,
http://www.cnn.com/2009/US/02/05/kellogg.phelps.
199. Mark Schlueb, Thousands Want Help from Shaq, ORLANDO SENTINEL, June 17, 2008,
at B1.
200. There is an argument that when an athlete has arrived at the pinnacle of the sport, they
continue to play for pure love of sport alone because fortune and fame no longer serve as
substantial motivating factors. Ironically, perhaps an athlete such as Michael Jordan, who
reached the highest ranks of professional sports and continued to play, embodies the pure
devotion to sport that the NCAA idealizes. Cf. Michael A. McCann, It’s Not About the Money:
The Role of Preferences, Cognitive Biases, and Heuristics Among Professional Athletes, 71
BROOKLYN L. REV. 1459, 1489–90 (2006) (examining evidence that professional athletes play
for many reasons other than money including loyalty, camaraderie, family, and winning).
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professionally. Although not every college athlete who dreams of
the NBA, NFL, NHL, or MLB is grounded in reality, thousands of
student-athletes can and do have the chance to enter the professional
ranks every year. This opportunity represents extraordinary economic
potential for top prospects, and thus it is a rational decision to pursue
professional opportunities to the fullest.
The NCAA’s canonical emphasis on “going pro in something
202
other than sports”
may represent the likely outcome of an
intercollegiate athletics career, but the college sports dream is no
longer simply a short love story. The dream is to rise to the realm of
athletic nobility, where the heroes are richly rewarded for their
triumph over the limitations of the human body. The NCAA’s
myopia regarding the professional aspirations of college athletes in
major sports creates a culture of amateurism that inaccurately reflects
contemporary intercollegiate athletics.
The NCAA’s approved athletic motivations, which focus on
physical improvement and the love of sport, are based not in legal
prescience but in obsolete romanticism. The law allows a much more
flexible and fluid conception of amateurism than the NCAA
approves; therefore, the NCAA has a wide breadth within which to
redefine amateurism. The law comprehends that athletes are
motivated by profound devotion to the ideal of sport, an appreciation
of the physical and social benefits of athletic participation, and the
203
potential for profit. A “new amateurism” composite that maintains
alignment with the law’s distinction between amateurism and
professionalism can track the continuing cultural evolution of sports.
2. Reduction of Restrictive Rules. The NCAA’s labyrinthine rules
surely result in unintentional violations. More surprising, however, is

201. Stacy A. Teicher, College Athletes Tackle Their Financial Future: Former Student
Athletes Go on the Road to Show Their College Counterparts How to Avoid Making the Same
Mistakes They Did, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 3, 2005, at 13, available at
http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/1003/p13s02-legn.html. Only about 1 percent of college athletes
succeed. Id.
202. E.g., Gary Brown, Wheaton’s King to Have Artwork Displayed at NCAA Convention,
NCAA NEWS, Jan. 8, 2009, http://www.ncaa.com/sports/w-lacros/spec-rel/010809aaa.html
(“We’re all familiar with the tagline on the NCAA’s promotional ads that say ‘[t]here are more
than 400,000 student-athletes and most of them will go pro in something other than sports . . . .’”
(quoting the NCAA’s Director of brand strategies and events Damon Schoening)).
203. The call for a new amateurism has been sounded, but the vision for that amateurism
varies. E.g., W. Burlette Carter, The Age of Innocence: The First 25 Years of the National
Collegiate Athletic Association, 1906 to 1931, 8 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 211, 273–84 (2006).
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the mass nullification by disobedience of some NCAA rules to which
schools, coaches, and professional teams turn blind eyes. Because the
NCAA relies on its members for enforcement of its amateurism
standards, the NCAA should reexamine its rules and limit them to
those truly necessary to protect amateurism. A morass of antagonistic
rules is not required by law; a redefined amateurism can shed rules
related to athlete employment, summer sport participation, agents,
promotion, and entry into the draft. Focusing on the most important,
enforceable rules and prohibiting pay for participation on the
intercollegiate sports teams would achieve the goals of preserving
amateurism and halting an athletics department arms race.
Importantly, from a legal perspective, such targeted rules will prevent
the judiciary from overturning rules or enforcement actions as
arbitrary and capricious.
3. Substitute Protections for Paternalism. The NCAA justifies a
number of its rules as putative protections of athletes from
commercial abuse. But in reality, those rules may be widely
unenforceable and detrimental to the interests of the athletes.
Paternalistic rules restrict athlete autonomy, limit choice, and may not
be in the athletes’ best economic interests. Rules that have these
negative effects on student-athletes but fail to provide significant
protections should be abolished, including any formulation of the noagent rule, NCAA restrictions on draft entry, and rules limiting
student-athletes’ employment or use of their own names, images, or
reputations for compensation.
The no-agent rule prohibits athletes from adequately pursuing
promotion and negotiations in their best economic interests. The rule
also may interfere with the attorney-client relationship between
agent-attorneys and prospects. It may also result in sophisticated
parties exerting unfair bargaining power over unsophisticated parties.
The NCAA’s no-agent cure here is worse than the NCAA’s feared
agent plague.
Alternative systems suggest that amateurism can be retained
while permitting athletes to contract with agents. Professor Richard
204
Karcher has proposed supervision of the athlete-agent relationship.

204. Karcher, supra note 102, at 224–25 (proposing standardized representation
agreements); see also Timothy Davis, Regulating the Athlete-Agent Industry: Intended and
Unintended Consequences, 42 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 781 passim (2006) (calling for a more
effective means of regulating the athlete-agent industry).
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Similarly, the international basketball organization requires agents to
205
conform to its standards and provide clear contract terms. A
requirement that agents have law degrees would help ensure that
agents are qualified to review and negotiate complex contracts and
would actually protect naïve players.
A deregulated version of draft entry for collegiate athletes would
provide more opportunities for student-athletes to maximize their
profitability and economic potential. Varying rules against multiple
draft entry essentially establish a timeline for strategic professional
decisions. Blanket NCAA prohibitions thus poorly account for
variations between the draft processes and require athletes to commit
to play on a college team for specific periods of time. The interests at
risk in deregulation of drafts are largely those of the student-athletes’
investors—the colleges. But the restrictions on draft entry limit the
probability that an athlete will enter the draft at the height of his
amateur career, which may cause the athlete to lose draft value and
bargaining power.
If amateurism is defined largely by an absence of the hallmarks
of professionalism, then the line between sports leagues may become
more permeable. National and international amateur sports
organizations recognize that semiprofessional and amateur sports
take many forms and exclusive membership on any particular team is
not required for an athlete to be an amateur. Likewise, the NCAA
should permit collegiate athletes to participate on multiple teams.
Permitting at least some compensation from those outside activities is
also reasonable.
Regulating student-athletes’ alternative employment gives the
organization strong control over the daily lives of student-athletes
and limits the student-athlete’s range of economic choices. But this
paternalism ultimately fails to improve the lives of student-athletes.
For some athletes, the most marketable skill they possess is their
athletic ability; restricting student-athletes’ ability to capitalize on this
asset reduces their value in an employment market and thus their
economic potential. Allowing student-athletes to choose to take on
any kind of part-time work, to negotiate more advantageous athletic
contracts, and to receive limited compensation from other amateur

205. See FÉDÉRATION INTERNATIONALE DE BASKETBALL, supra note 188, H.5.3.3.
(requiring agents to be licensed); id. H.5.6.2.1(a) (requiring agents to abide by FIBA
regulations); id. H.5.6.2.1.(p) (requiring agents to demonstrate transparency in their dealings
with clients).
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teams would provide them with valuable experience and economic
independence. The amateurism resulting from this liberalized regime
would more closely resemble the athletics world as it is, rather than
the world as the NCAA would like it to be.
CONCLUSION
The dense rules that the NCAA has imposed to protect the
intercollegiate athletics enterprise from labor, tax, and antitrust
consequences are both unnecessary and misguided. The system that
has developed gives only the NCAA and colleges a seat at the
bargaining table, excluding the voice of the student-athlete. This
exclusion is inappropriate given the dramatic impact of the rules on
the daily lives and career arcs of the student-athletes.
Perhaps this design flaw is a result of commercialization,
collective action problems, and unequal bargaining power. But the
NCAA’s failure to act in the best interests of student-athletes is more
complex, and it may be inextricably linked to society’s failure to
recognize the hypocrisy of college athletics compared to other skilled
endeavors. Student-athletes are expected to yield nearly total control
to an educational institution and a third-party organization for their
professional and personal decisions, self-employment autonomy, and
rights to their images, name, and reputations. But other hyphenated
students who serve dual educational roles—such as the studentmusician, the student-actor, the student-artist, and the studentdancer—are not expected to make the same sacrifices. The
susceptibility of the student to the harms of commercialization is no
greater in the case of the student-athlete than in the case of the
creative composer or poet. And the slight differences between
student-athletes and other uniquely talented students do not justify
the NCAA’s micromanagement of student-athletes. Some regulations
may be necessary, but the extent of the NCAA’s incursion into the
private life of the student-athlete is not.
The legal background of the amateurism debate suggests that the
law has evolved with a changing cultural definition of amateurism,
but the NCAA lags behind in recognizing athletes as they are.
206
Despite its complicity in the increased commercialization of sport,
the NCAA has failed to create adequate accommodations for the
professional and financial well-being of student-athletes. Indeed,

206. E.g., Brown, supra note 52.
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some of the very rules drafted to protect student-athletes
disadvantage them at the bargaining table. It is thus time for an
amateurism that better serves the modern goals and realities of
amateur sport and does not dictate student-athletes’ every decision.
The amateur athlete need not be wholly self-sacrificing in order to
play for love of the game and create value for the public.

